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Abstract 
Signed in 1976, the EU-Canada relationship was the first bilateral agreement that the EU signed with an 
industrialised third country. Modest strengthening of the ties was achieved with the 2004 EU-Canada 
Partnership Agenda. A fully-fledged free trade agreement was in the works at this time, but suspended 
in 2006. The EU-Canada strategic partnership agreement (SPA) and the Comprehensive Economic 
Trade Agreement (CETA) did not materialise until more than a decade later, in 2016. This paper focuses 
in particular on the strategic partnership dimension. It explores why an SPA was possible in 2016, but 
not before. To answer this question, the paper looks at four time periods. In so doing it explores the 
origins of the EU-Canada agreement, how the EU-Canada relationship changed over time, and 
examines how a more profound strategic partnership came about when it did. In its analysis it considers 
institutional, domestic and geopolitical factors. It briefly speculates about the possible future of this 
partnership. 
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Introduction 
The European Union (EU)2 and Canada signed a strategic partnership agreement (SPA) 
on 30 October 2016. It provisionally entered into force on 1 April 2017 (European Union, 
2017). This paper studies the origins of this agreement and examines how the EU-
Canada relationship in this regard changed over time. It explores why an SPA was 
possible in 2016, but not before. In this paper I divide up EU-Canada collaboration into 
four time periods: period one (from 1959-1976); period two (1977-1996); period three 
(1997-2008); period four (2009-present). 
The Canadian agreement with the EU is an important one. Signed in 1976, the 
‘Framework Agreement for Commercial and Economic Co-operation between the 
European Communities and Canada’ was the first bilateral strategic partnership that the 
                                                        
1 An earlier version of this paper was presented at the International Workshop Jean Monnet Network on EU-Canada 
Relations: The EU and Canada in Dialogue “New Opportunities for the EU-Canada Strategic Partnership”, 8 
November 2019, TU Darmstadt, organised by Michèle Knodt, Technical University Darmstadt, and Natalia Chaban, 
University of Canterbury, Christchurch. The author thanks Sharon Pardo, Godelieve Quisthoudt-Rowohl, Antoine 
Rayroux, the other workshop participants and the editors of the special issue for comments on an earlier version of 
this paper. She also thanks Fengan Jiang (Richard), PhD candidate at the Europa Institute of Leiden University, 
Gordon S. Smith, and an anonymous reviewer of the journal for comments on an earlier version of this paper. The 
usual disclaimer applies. 
2 For simplicity, I use ‘European Union’ or ‘EU’ to refer to the actual EU as well as to the earlier ‘European 




EU signed with an industrialised third country. Modest strengthening of the ties was 
achieved in 1990, 1995 and 1996 and also with the 2004 EU-Canada Partnership Agenda 
(DeBardeleben and Leblond, 2010). However, a fully-fledged free trade agreement let 
alone a strategic partnership remained elusive for some time. Ultimately, however, the 
Comprehensive Economic Trade Agreement (CETA) and the SPA were both signed on 
the same date.3 Although at the time of writing their full ratification is not yet complete, 
the EU-Canada relationship has been further strengthened by having these agreements 
provisionally enter into force. 
This paper examines the following question: why was this more institutionalised 
collaboration possible to be signed in 2016, but not before? This paper seeks to address 
this question by assessing the path of the creation of the strategic partnership 
agreement: why has the deepening of the EU-Canada strategic partnership been a 
challenge to set up in the first three decades after having signed early institutional 
structure provided by the 1976 agreement. To assess this process the paper seeks to 
understand the role of governance structures of both partners as well as the strategic 
opportunity that came out of the agreement. The existing literature suggests that earlier 
cooperation in this domain failed for two reasons. First, in the earlier time period, both 
Canada and the EU did not think that the partnership was as important. Instead, Canada 
was mostly oriented towards the United States (US) and the same held for the EU. 
Neither saw a need to ‘go around’ the US in terms of developing relationships with each 
other that would not be reproduced by the other transatlantic partner. Most of the early 
period was characterised by the Cold War with both parties being in the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO) which provided a strong security umbrella. Furthermore, 
internally the EU was institutionally not very strong and security as a policy area was not 
well developed at the EU-level. Each of the parties was also caught up with its own 
internal issues. On the Canadian side, the early years were coloured by issues such as the 
Quebec referendum, the creation of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 
but also the fisheries war (Crowley 2004). On the European side, the first two decades, 
internal European integration was more developed in the area of agriculture, commerce, 
and trade matters rather than on security and defence matters. Thus, in addition to not 
having a clear sense of its strategic goals, the EU did not yet ‘speak with one voice’ on 
these more external political matters (Potter, 1999; Long, 2003; Barry, 2004; Bernard-
Meunier, 2006; Croci and Verdun, 2006; Haglund and Mérand, 2010; Mérand and 
Vandemoortele, 2011). Second, there was also a lack of appreciation of the multilevel 
governance and federalist institutional set-up on both sides (Haglund, 2000; Benz, 
2010; Verdun and Wood, 2010). The European Union did not understand fully how 
decentralised the Canadian federation was; the Canadians, in turn, for many years 
lacked a solid understanding of the institutional set up of the European Union. As a 
result, Canadian diplomats were more inclined to look to European member states 
separately and bilaterally rather than deal with the EU as a collective. The present paper 
seeks to re-assess these two insights from the literature in light of the recently signed 
SPA agreement with a view to obtaining a better insight as to why the agreements could 
be completed this time compared to the failed attempts (or weak arrangements) earlier. 
The second goal of this paper is to understand why the eventual combination of the 
CETA and the SPA became the most comprehensive agreement between the EU and 
Canada to date, including many different dimensions (political, economic, strategic, 
                                                        
3 https://pm.gc.ca/en/news/statements/2016/10/30/eu-canada-summit-joint-declaration 
 
Verdun, ANZJES 11(3) 
 
20 
security, judicial, environmental and social)? Were there any set-backs and if so how can 
we best understand those disruptions? Part of the reason to explain this relationship 
must be found in the following factors: an assessment of the costs and benefits of the 
type of relationship between Canada and the EU, the perceived role of the United States 
(US) and the global arena, and the need mutually to understand the institutional 
structure of governance of both partners.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section looks at the 
literature of the Canada-EU relations with a particular focus on the Strategic Partnership 
Agreement. The third section provides an empirical case study of the Strategic 
Partnership, offering an analysis of this case study. The fifth section concludes. 
What is the Canada EU Strategic Partnership agreement? A review 
of the literature on the Canada-EU relations  
In what follows I provide a brief review of the literature that discusses the strategic 
activities developed between Canada and the European Union. I have grouped these 
agreements into four time periods: period one (from 1959-1976); period two (1977-
1996); period three (1997-2008); period four (2009-present). 
Table 1: Canada-EU Agreements (1959-2016) (selection) 




1959 Agreement between the Government of Canada and the 
European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) for 
Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy 
x  
1976 Framework Agreement for Commercial and Economic Co-
operation between the European Communities and Canada 
 x 
1990 ‘Declaration on European Community-Canada Relations’  x 
1991 Agreement on nuclear co-operation (amendment of the 
1959 agreement) 
x  
1995 ‘EU-Canada Agreement on Higher Education and Training 
(renewed in 2000) 
x  
1996 ‘Joint Political Declaration on EU-Canada Relations’  x 
1996 ‘Joint Canada-EU Action Plan 1996’  x 
1996 Agreement on Scientific and Technical Cooperation x  
1996 Agreement for the conclusion of negotiations between 
under GATT Art XXIV:6 
x  
1997 Agreement on international humane trapping standards 
(with the Russian federation) 
  
1998 Agreement on Customs Cooperation and Mutual Assistance 





1998 Agreement on Sanitary Measures to protect public and 
animal health in respect of trade in live animals and animal 
products 
x  
1999 Agreement regarding the Application of Competition Laws x  
2004 Agreement concerning trade and commerce in alcoholic 
beverages 
x  
2004 EU-Canada Partnership Agenda  x 
2005 Agreement establishing a framework for the participation of 
Canada in the EU crisis management operations 
  x 
2009 ‘Air Safety Agreement’ x  
All agreements are between the Government of Canada and the European Communities unless specified 
otherwise. 
Sources: Commission of the European Communities (2003): 16-17; Mahant 1985, various other sources. 





1959-1976: In the first period we find the agreement that was signed between the 
European Atomic Energy Community and Canada in 1959. Together with the agreement 
with the US (signed in 1958) it was the first such accord and it ends with the signing of 
the 1976 agreement. The early work focuses on the 1976 agreement (cf. Mahant, 1981). It 
provided structure for dialogue. A Joint Cooperation Committee (JCC) was to meet 
annually ‘to promote and keep under review the various commercial and economic 
cooperation activities’. Towards the end of this period scholars wrote about Canada’s 
policy towards the rest of the world using the terminology of ‘third option’, meaning to 
steer away from an overly strong reliance on the US (Mace and Hervouet, 1989).  
1977-1996: The second time-period starts with the entry into force of the 1976 
agreement, contains the 1990 agreement, ‘The Declaration on Transatlantic Relations 
between the European Community and its Member States and Canada’ and the 1995 
sectoral agreement on ‘EU-Canada Agreement on Higher Education and Training’ as 
well as the 1996 ‘Joint Political Declaration on EU-Canada Relations’. Edelgard Mahant 
in an overview of the kind of collaboration that took place right after the signing of the 
1976 agreement4 till the mid 1980s, provides a useful overview of what has happened in 
the first decade. She identifies that most of the ‘high level’ meetings are in fact not at the 
highest level but rather at the level of the assistant deputy minister (Canada) and deputy 
director-general (Commission). Mahant characterises this level as “the meeting point 
between the political and the ‘official’ levels… too low a level to deal with basic political 
issues but at too high a level to negotiate the details of the trade and scientific co-
operation which are the day-to-day subjects of Canada-Community discussions.” 
(Mahant, 1985, p. 286). She also describes the annual meetings of the parliamentary 
delegations of European and Canadian parliaments during this time. She lists various 
subcommittees that have met during the period, such as the ‘industrial co-operation 
                                                        
4 Mahant (1985: 285) reports that the ‘Semi-Annual’ or ‘High levels’ meetings started to take place already before the 
1976 namely, since the 1972 informal Canada-European Community Agreement although the meetings did not take 
place twice a year in every year (both in 1974 and 1977 only one such meeting took place). 
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subcommittee’ and the ‘preparatory and general co-operation subcommittee’. A 
highlight of this period was the signing of the 1990 political declaration but the 
remainder of the 1990s did not generate major initiatives in bilateral cooperation. 
Charles Pentland identifies Canada’s response to renewed process of European 
integration process, as the cold war was coming to an end, as “the most far-reaching 
challenge to Canada arising from the post-war unification of western Europe” (Pentland, 
1991) There were, however, numerous smaller, sectoral, agreements between Canada 
and the EU (see Table 1). Furthermore, cooperation took place within other international 
organisations. This piecemeal approach was the best that could be arranged during this 
time. These smaller steps should, however, not be underestimated. The final part of this 
second period is characterised by fishing sector wars. At this time Canada and the EU 
were having numerous issues around fishing in the North Atlantic (Barry, 1998) with 
Canada eventually sending warships to try to address the issue of Portuguese and 
Spanish fishermen alleged overfishing and violating international agreements on the 
quantity and size of fish. The strategy chosen was confrontational but aimed at forcing 
the issue to the top of the agenda by using rogue strategies (Missios and Plourde, 1996). 
Though it resolved the matter in Canada’s favour, it cost the country considerably in 
terms of hurting diplomatic relations (Howe and Kerby, 2009 5 ). Nevertheless, as 
mentioned above, the two sides did manage to sign the 1996 ‘Joint Political Declaration 
on EU-Canada Relations’. 
1997-2008: During the third period Canada started to put the EU more centrally on the 
foreign policy agenda (Potter, 1999, p. 1). It chose the bilateral agreement system 
whereby different sectoral issues were chosen as a path forward. For instance, in 1996 
both parties signed an Agreement for Scientific and Technical Cooperation. In the same 
year they also concluded an Agreement for the conclusion of negotiations under GATT 
Art XXIV:6. Furthermore they also cooperated together with a third party (the Russian 
Federation) international humane trapping standards (in 1997). Two other agreements 
were signed in 1998, one in the area of Customs Cooperation and Mutual Assistance in 
Customs Markets and another Agreement on Sanitary Measures to protect public and 
animal health in respect of trade in live animals and animal products. A year later, in 
1999, they signed an Agreement regarding the Application of Competition Laws. In 2004 
they signed another sectoral agreement that focused on single market issues, namely the 
Agreement concerning trade and commerce in alcoholic beverages. This period was 
closed with an important step forward on various issues that were bundled together 
under the 2004 EU-Canada Partnership Agenda. A year later both parties signed the 
Agreement establishing a framework for the participation of Canada in the EU crisis 
management operations (2005). All in all, there were many sectoral agreements but an 
overarching free trade agreement proved difficult. 
2009-present: This period started off with another sectoral agreement, namely an EU-
Canada ‘Agreement on civil aviation safety between the European Community and 
Canada’ (2009). Shortly after it became clear that the EU and Canada could collaborate 
on a free trade agreement and possibly a strategic partnership agreement if they 
embarked on the negotiations in a more bottom up fashion, in particular on the 
Canadian side. Earlier attempts to have a free trade agreement suffered on the Canadian 
side by having been conducted only at the federal level without including lower level 
partners such as the provinces and territories. The Europeans were surprised that it was 
                                                        
5 Gordon S. Smith, who was involved in these fishwars as deputy minister of Foreign Affairs, characterised Canada’s 




so difficult in Canada to have federal level bodies negotiate on behalf of the lower 
governance levels in Canada. The negotiations were very trying but eventually they 
pulled off a comprehensive economic trade agreement and the strategic partnership 
agreement and both were signed on the same date in 2016. 
Case study of the Strategic Partnership  
Mérand and Rayroux (2018, pp. 189-194) identify three main debates within the EU 
about how the EU seeks to deal with its foreign relations vis-à-vis the rest of the world. 
These three debates shed light on how the EU-Canada agreements fit within the EU 
internal considerations. The first debate concerns the extent to which the large EU 
member states have more influence over EU foreign policy compared to the smaller 
ones. The second is whether all of the member states would participate in all EU actions. 
The EU consists of members with different interests, some are neutral or may have 
different relations with countries outside of the EU (due to their different historical past 
with countries external to the EU). The third is the extent to which the EU should remain 
focused mostly on ‘soft power’ or whether it needs to move towards becoming a stronger 
military actor. The negotiations between Canada and the EU covered all three of these 
debates.  
Canadian foreign policy has traditionally been in line with its main allies (the US, 
Europe) and heavily oriented towards multilateralism. Over time, it has become more 
assertive and started to consider to what extent Canadian Foreign Policy would be 
different from heavily relying on the US. When Robert Kagan famously argued in 2002 
that the transatlantic drift of the turn of the century could be seen as the Europeans 
being from Venus and the Americans from Mars, it hit a nerve in the Canadian context 
(Long, 2003; see Kagan, 2003). At the start of the negotiations that would lead to the 
SPA and CETA eventually signed in 2016, the EU had become a much more important 
potential partner to Canada than before (Haglund and Mérand, 2010). Both parts had 
also learnt about the importance of appreciating the difficulties of negotiating with 
loosely federated systems (Benz, 2010). In the run-up to the negotiations, Canadian 
elites considered numerous international threats that were in need of attention.  
In a paper analysing the threat perceptions of Canadian political, bureaucratic and 
academic security elite, as compared with those articulated by the Canadian government 
based on a survey results with bureaucrats and foreign policy experts, they found that 
the EU was perceived to be important to solve the most salient foreign policy issues of 
the day but not absolutely crucial (Tossutti, Croci and Verdun, 2007). Experts also still 
look more towards the US for support than across the Atlantic.  
The negotiations for the Strategic Partnership started only in September 2011 at the 
same time as those for CETA. Here the premise was that the 1976 EU-Canada framework 
agreement had become ineffective due to the many changes in the bilateral relations that 
had emerged since its signing in the mid 1970s. Also, the entry into force of the Lisbon 
Treaty enabled the EU to be better prepared, institutionally, in dealing with foreign 
relations (with the European External Action Service having been created). European 
Commission President José Manuel Barroso and Canadian Prime Minister Stephen 
Harper announced in the spring of 2014 that an agreement in principle had been 
reached, in the margins of a summit that took place in The Hague (Gardner, 2014). 
Three years later, in September 2014, various media signalled that the EU and Canada 
were closer to reaching an agreement (Gardner, 2014). It was formally adopted by the 
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European Commission in April 2015 and signed by the EU and Canadian leaders at the 
EU-Canada summit on 30 October 2016. Some of the issues on which progress had been 
made on the partnership agenda of 2004 was incorporated into this SPA. A new 
innovation was made here to avoid a deadlock: knowing that ratification could be an 
obstacle, namely to have some parts of the SPA enter into effect even before full 
ratification had been reached. 
In terms of the substance, the SPA deals with issues related to values and reinforces an 
interest in bilateral cooperation, in particular in policy areas where strategic cooperation 
would be beneficial to both parties such as agriculture, arctic policies, environmental, 
fisheries, internet-security, judicial, maritime issues, political, research and 
development, security, social, taxation, combatting terrorism, and of course on global 
economic issues (although most of the economic issues which deal with bilateral matters 
is dealt with comprehensively in the CETA agreement). In these areas the two sides 
declared to want to enhance the dialogue and where appropriate cooperate. The 
important issues to do with values are cooperation on issues such as human rights, 
democracy, the rule of law, peace and security, and so on. One of the ways, mentioned in 
the agreement, to ensure collaboration is to work together in various multilateral 
forums. The text literally states:  
The Parties share a commitment to multilateralism and efforts to improve the 
effectiveness of regional and international fora and organisations such as the 
United Nations and its specialised organisations and agencies, the Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO), the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe 
(OSCE) and other multilateral fora” (SPA, article 8(1)).  
Other forms of cooperation through such multilateral organisations included the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, and the various G-7 or G-20 fora. In 
addition, another way to enhance consultation would be through summits where leaders 
meet (on an annual basis) and have high-level meetings such as at the level of foreign 
ministers. Furthermore, consultation would be developed at the various ministerial 
levels depending on the policy area of ‘mutual interest’ (SPA article 27(1c)). In addition, 
Joint Ministerial Committees would be established to replace the earlier created 
‘transatlantic dialogue’ (SPA article 27 (2b)) as well as establish a Joint Cooperation 
Committee.  
When analysing this SPA we find a few things that are remarkable. First is that it covers 
a very wide range of issues. The SPA brings together so many different issues that were 
previously either explicitly mentioned in bilateral agreements or were considered to be 
of mutual interest but less well articulated in formal agreements. Second, the wording of 
the SPA signals a need to collaborate as much as possible in as many areas as possible, 
and using as much as possible the various multilateral forums in addition to having 
annual meetings.  
In earlier attempts to complete such an agreement in the area of free trade the multilevel 
governance nature of the EU and of Canada was something that was hard to understand 
by either of the parties (Croci and Tossutti, 2009; Benz, 2010). Furthermore, the SPA 
only emerged when both Canada and the EU realised that they needed to diversify away 
from a predominant orientation towards the US (Croci and Verdun, 2004). Both sides 




the benefits that the ‘other transatlantic’ partner good provide (DeBardeleben and 
LeBlond, 2010). Over the first half of the 2010s, the US was increasingly orienting itself 
towards Asia and neither Canada nor the EU were given the feeling by US diplomats that 
they were very ‘special’. At this time, the EU was becoming more aware of the need to 
have its own external relations. With the EU expanding into countries (through 
enlargement, but also developing an European Neighbourhood Policy), it became clear 
to the Europeans that they shared much more with Canada than they did with these 
other countries that they were pulling closer (Pentland, 2009). Finally, the realization 
dawned on both sides that the collaboration would benefit from being, on the one hand a 
free trade agreement, on the other hand more ‘strategic’. To keep the negotiations 
doable, and also given how the EU is structured in terms of competences for foreign 
policy versus trade issues, having these agreements discussed at two separate tables 
increased the chance of success across the agreements. Thus, both elements were 
separated. Dividing up these issues this way was something the EU had started to do 
(Knodt, Piefer and Müller, 2015). Having these separate issues covered by both sides was 
also of interest to Canada. In fact, by separating out these issues, the SPA agreement was 
able to be more declaratory rather than overly legal. It also meant that the trade 
agreement could remain separate. Having the SPA meant updating the 1976 agreement 
so as to cover a much broader range of issues. 
Conclusion 
Having reviewed the four periods of EU-Canada cooperation, this article is now in a 
position to provide an answer to the core question that is addressed here: why was it 
possible to sign an SPA, in 2016 but not before? In answering this question the paper 
looked at why the deepening of the EU-Canada strategic partnership had been a 
challenge to set up in the first three decades after having signed early institutional 
structure provided by the 1976 agreement. In providing an answer to the overarching 
question raised here, this paper took stock of the various agreements that have been 
made in the period since the 1950s. It looked among other things at the role of the 
agreements that had been signed.  
The literature reviewed suggested that, among other things, earlier cooperation in this 
domain after 1976 mostly consisted of sectoral agreements in part because Canada and 
the EU had not yet identified the Canada-EU partnership as important to the 
international well-being of either side, whether this was economic, security, or 
otherwise. Each of them relied on cold war legacies with the US being the dominant 
partner in the transatlantic alliance and neither of them considering the need for an 
institutionalised bilateral agreement separate from the US as absolutely crucial. Clearly, 
during the first and second time periods, (that is, respectively 1959-1976 and 1977-1996) 
the international context was still characterised as bipolar with the Soviet Union and its 
partners versus the US and the western partners with all of them collaborating on 
security matters through NATO. Furthermore the institutional structure of the EU was 
still less developed compared to what it became with the entry into force of the 
Maastricht Treaty (November 1993) and later the Lisbon Treaty (December 2009). The 
EU was a unitary actor only in the area of commercial relations, not in the area of foreign 
relations, but both treaties contributed to a further institutional development of the EU 
as a foreign actors. Indeed, even to this day, the EU is only as strong in foreign relations 
as the agreement that can be mustered among the member states. Yet, the Lisbon Treaty 
has provided the EU with a bit more bureaucratic and institutional apparatus to make it 
easier to work on what the EU is about in terms of foreign relations. Thus, the reason 
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that the strategic partnership and the CETA could be signed in 2016 has both an 
endogenous and an exogenous component. Endogenous in that both Canada and the EU 
were realising that they were internally needing to diversify and become less reliant on 
the US. In the case of the EU, the institutional structure of the EU had changed with the 
Lisbon Treaty. In Canada, its experience with the failed trade agreement with the EU in 
the 2000s had brought about a realisation that any agreement like this needed stronger 
buy-in from lower level governments. Exogenous factors was a move of the US away, 
gradually, from that of a reliable transatlantic partner that was keen on multilateralism 
with a strong allegiance to Canada and the EU, towards an orientation increasingly more 
towards the rising powers of the rest of the world. Neither Canada nor the EU were 
receiving strong signals from the US that they were an ‘important’ or ‘preferred’ 
partners. Thus it became easier to do a bilateral deal together. Furthermore, each of 
these polities needed the experience of the prior decades to learn that the other side was 
governed institutionally in a loosely federal way. Each of them had veto players among 
them that needed to be catered to, and thus any negotiation between both sides needed 
to be undertaken very carefully with full attention to the many voices around the table. 
Because of these factors, neither side was keen to work on a comprehensive agreement 
prior to the fourth period. In fact, during the third period there could have been a deeper 
free trade agreement but it did not materialise in part because on the Canadian side the 
federal level was unable to commit the lower levels to a joint agreement. Thus, the SPA 
(together with the CETA that was signed at the same time and covered other ground) 
became the most comprehensive set of agreements that the EU signed with another 
major advanced economy. It includes various dimensions: agriculture, arctic politics, 
environmental, fisheries, internet-security, judicial, maritime issues, political, research 
and development, security, social, taxation, combatting terrorism, and of course global 
economic issues. As we look towards the next period we await a few developments: first, 
whether all member states will ratify the SPA agreement; and second, what the 
Agreement will lead to in practice. Only time will tell whether the framework offered will 
provide the collaboration those who drafted the agreement had in mind. 
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